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Interpreting the Challenger disaster: communication under conditions of risk and liability

Department of Speech Communication, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA

This research is a case study of the events following the Challenger accident and focuses on the way in which members of NASA before the accident and the Presidential Commission following the accident acted in ways to protect the survival of NASA as a viable agency. The central theme of the strategies of protection was to localize the blame to individuals at lower levels in NASA and to fix blame on a communications failure (a technical problem) rather than blaming the leadership of NASA (an institutional problem). In its conclusion the article addresses the issues involved in crossing entrepreneurial cultures that include risk and high technology with bureaucratic cultures that are safe and procedural.

Organization & Environment, Vol. 2, No. 3-4, 211-227 (1988)
DOI: 10.1177/108602668800200303


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